Trinity of Terror: Arms Control Between the US, Russia, and China

While nuclear crises between the “Big Three” can still be managed, preventing an arms race will be much more difficult. 

The rise of China as a prospective strategic nuclear superpower increases the challenge of maintaining deterrence stability and implementing nuclear arms control over the world’s most dangerous weapons. In light of these and other concerns regarding nuclear stability, what is the current strategic nuclear arms control situation between the United States and Russia? How will China’s buildup impact the nuclear arms race and the prospects for arms control? Finally, what could be the impact of missile defenses on the outcomes of future nuclear force exchanges among the Big Three nuclear superstates?

The United States and Russia: New Life for New START?

Russia’s war against Ukraine cast a shadow over the future of the New START nuclear arms reduction treaty. First agreed upon by the United States and Russia in 2010, New START was extended in 2021 for an additional five years, with an expiration date of February 2026. New START limited each state signatory to a maximum number of 1,550 operationally deployed warheads on land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers.

Under New START counting rules, each heavy bomber capable of delivering nuclear weapons counts as a single weapon. However, in practice, bombers can carry variable loadings of gravity bombs and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). Russia withdrew from participation in the New START process as a protest against US support for Ukraine against Russia’s invasion. However, Russia declared its intention to continue limiting its operational deployments of weapons and launchers to New START limits for an indefinite future.

Both the United States and Russia are currently modernizing the various components of their strategic nuclear triads, which include land-based missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and long-range bombers. In the US case, the modernization includes not only replacements for the various launch systems but also warheads and upgraded nuclear infrastructure. Additionally, the strategic NC3 (nuclear command, control, and communications) system will also be improved, along with supporting space-based intelligence and warning, navigation, targeting, and other assets.

Russian launch systems are also being modernized, with newer generations of ICBMs and SLBMs scheduled to replace some existing systems, including hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV) retrofitted onto existing launchers. Russia is also working on a candidate nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered, ground-launched intercontinental cruise missile (Burevestnik) and a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed torpedo (Poseidon) planned for deployment with specially constructed submarines.

None of the US or Russian plans or programs necessarily precludes a future extension of New START deployment limits beyond 2026. On the other hand, a reboot of New START or a post-New START regime of arms limitations would need to include protocols for monitoring and verifying the actual numbers and characteristics of deployed weapons and launchers. On-site inspections required by the original New START agreement have been suspended for several years, resulting in decreased transparency of both sides’ activities. Clearly, a positive change in the political atmosphere between Moscow and Washington will be necessary before February 2026, or New START will expire without a replacement plan. In that case, a more competitive and less manageable strategic arms race cannot be ruled out.

China’s Nuclear Stockpiling

US defense officials and expert analysts have concluded that China plans to modernize its strategic nuclear deterrent and expand its size and diversity, potentially to achieve parity with the forces of the United States and Russia. A study group convened by the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory noted in 2023 that:

For the first time in its nuclear history, the United States faces two major power adversaries armed with large and diverse nuclear forces, capable of challenging the United States and its allies in a limited regional war fought with conventional forces, and bound together by a hostility to U.S.-led global and regional orders and the resolve to bring about their end.

Similarly, the United States Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States warned that US strategy should no longer treat China’s nuclear forces as a “‘lesser included’ nuclear threat” and that the United States needs a nuclear posture capable of simultaneously deterring both countries. In addition, the Department of Defense has projected a consistent pattern of improvement regarding China’s growing nuclear capabilities:

DOD estimates that the PRC will probably have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030, much of which will be deployed at higher readiness levels and will continue growing its force to 2035 in line with its goal of ensuring PLA modernization is ‘basically complete’ that year, which serves as an important milestone on the road to Xi’s goal of a ‘world-class’ military by 2049.

One challenge facing the US government and other estimators of future Chinese nuclear capabilities is the lack of transparency in the PRC’s declaratory policy about its nuclear deterrence strategy and force modernization plans.

Will China opt for a so-called “minimum deterrent” based on a secure second strike capability or a more ambitious deterrent that would provide various nuclear options across the spectrum of possible political, military, economic, and other targets? Should China be assumed to plan for nuclear war against the United States and its allies, or, as well, for possible conflict with Russia (if currently rosy political relations later turn sour) or India? How will China’s nuclear modernization overlap with improvements in its conventional forces for a possible conflict with the United States over Taiwan?

Based on prior experience, Chinese strategizing would likely treat issues of nuclear force modernization and nuclear deterrence within a more inclusive frame of reference that would privilege information-based deterrence and warfighting, together with non-military instruments of influence, including political, social, economic, informational, and cultural factors. China would likely see nuclear weapons as insurance against any American or other attempts to defeat it in a conventional war or against any attempt to use nuclear coercion against China as an instrument of influence. From this perspective, China would view the actual use of nuclear weapons as a last resort.

Another issue will be China’s approach to transparency, especially the monitoring and verification necessary for viable arms agreements. Here again, China may become more explicit about its nuclear forces as it closes in on the arsenals of the United States and Russia. An entirely open-ended arms race benefits none of the nuclear Big Three. The journey from opacity to transparency will be a long road for China. Still, Chinese leaders have demonstrated remarkable skills in several other realms of international relations, including economic competition, information warfare, scientific and technological innovation, and high-end diplomacy.

It would not be surprising to see China adopt a “reasonable sufficiency” approach to arms races in existing technologies. At the same time, it leapfrogs into next-generation leadership in artificial intelligence, big data, autonomous systems, military uses of space, and human-machine interfaces. In summary, the prospects for crisis stability under a tripartite post-New START regime are potentially favorable. However, the case for arms race stability among China, Russia, and the United States is more problematic.

The Missile Defense Mirage 

One dream of some US and Soviet political leaders and military scientists during the Cold War was the possible deployment of a strategic missile defense that could nullify the possibility of an enemy attack on the American or Soviet homeland. From the perspective of available technologies, these hopes proved to be more aspirational than operational.

The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 codified the prevailing strategic doctrine that mutual deterrence depended on assured retaliation based on survivable offensive forces. Research and development on ballistic missile defenses continued after the Cold War, and the George W. Bush administration eventually abrogated the ABM Treaty, initiating the program now known as the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD).

Currently, this program deploys some 44 interceptors in Alaska and California and is supported by a missile attack warning, battle management, and command and control (BMC2) architecture. Additional ballistic missile defense capabilities are available on ship- and shore-based Aegis Combat Systems, which evolved from the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) in support of US NATO allies against short-, medium-, and intermediate-range attacks. This initiative, initiated during the Obama administration, continued until 2022.

From “Star Wars” to “Golden Dome”

The Trump administration proposed in January 2025 to commit the United States to building a comprehensive missile defense system called an “Iron Dome for America” or “Golden Dome.” The administration argued that an effective defense for the homeland was necessary due to the increasing threat posed by advanced strike weapons, including ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles.

The objectives of the system would include space-based interceptors capable of boost-phase intercept, deployment of underlayer and terminal phase intercept capabilities postured to defeat a countervalue attack, and capabilities to defeat missile attacks before launch and in the boost phase.

Speaking from the White House on May 20, President Trump noted that he was “completing the job” that former President Ronald Reagan began in the 1980s with his Strategic Defense Initiative proposal (also known as “Star Wars”), an ambitious plan that the technology of that era was insufficient to fulfill.

The “golden dome” for America will be based primarily on space satellites for warning, tracking, and intercepting, utilizing technological advantages that are still in development. The means of intercepting attacking missiles would presumably include directed energy weapons as well as kinetic kill and “left of launch” techniques for destroying enemy missiles on their launching pads or immediately after launch.

This could take years of research and development prior to deployment, not to mention cost overruns. The Trump administration and other proponents of strategic missile defenses argue that there is no alternative, given the hostile alliance between two competing superpowers, as well as the obvious determination of China and Russia, especially the former, to surpass the United States in their ability to exploit space for military purposes.

There Is No Last Move in Nuclear Strategy

The strategic dilemma inherent in missile defenses is how well we want them to work. If they work “too well,” they disarm another state’s second strike capability as well as its first strike capability. Such a condition will likely not be acceptable to the other two superpowers, who, if they cannot directly contest it, will attempt to devise a way around it. Possible strategies for designing around an opposed strategic missile defense system could include cyberattacks on space and terrestrial assets, nuclear terrorism, or attack vehicles other than ballistic or cruise missiles (e.g., drone swarms).

However technologically savvy an American Iron Dome may appear, a responsive enemy will either seek technical countermeasures or shift its research and development into other competitive technologies (e.g., AI, quantum computing, underwater attack vehicles). Unfortunately, there is no last move in military strategy.

By: Stephen Cimbala and Lawrence Korb

Stephen Cimbala is a Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous books and articles on international security issues.

Lawrence Korb, a retired Navy captain, has held national security positions at several think tanks and served in the Pentagon in the Reagan administration.